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Can We Train Basic Empathy? A Phenomenological Proposal 
 
Within the field of nursing, there is widespread agreement that empathy is key to effective 
clinical practice. In light of this view, many nursing programs incorporate empathy training 
into their curricula. But what does it mean to train empathy? In the nursing literature, the 
concept of empathy refers to a broad array of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral 
phenomena. And its meaning often overlaps with a number of other key concepts in the 
literature, such as sympathy, care, and compassion. Reviews of empathy education in nursing 
point to this conceptual confusion as a major stumbling block to the design, implementation, 
and evaluation of empathy training (see, e.g., Brunero et al., 2010; Williams and Stickley, 
2010).1 
 In this article, we put forward a conceptualization of basic empathy that is narrower 
and more specific than what is commonly used in the nursing literature.2 Then, we briefly 
outline how this conceptualization may provide a foundation for empathy training programs. 
Rather than draw from the fields of psychology or cognitive and affective neuroscience, 
which have had a major influence on the conceptualization of empathy in nursing, we instead 
turn to the philosophical tradition of phenomenology. Other phenomenological concepts, 
such as skilled coping or embodied know-how (Benner, 1984), have successfully informed 
nursing research, education, and practice. The phenomenological concept of empathy has 
recently received some attention in the nursing literature (see, e.g., Morgan, 2017; van Dijke 
et al., 2020; Fernandez and Zahavi 2020); but its potential for guiding nursing education has 
not yet been adequately explored.3 In what follows, we define the phenomenological concept 
of empathy and consider how this concept can inform approaches to empathy training. 
A Phenomenological Conceptualization of Empathy 
Discussions of empathy in the nursing literature often rely upon concepts borrowed from 
psychology and neuroscience. In particular, nurses often rely on the distinction between 
cognitive and emotional empathy (see Bloom 2014).4 Cognitive empathy involves the use of 
higher-level intellectual processes to understand another’s experience; these processes may 
include imaginative perspective taking, critical thinking, or inference, among other 
techniques. Emotional empathy, in contrast, is understood as the ability to experience and 
understand another by reproducing and sharing their affective state; you understand the 
other’s experience by feeling the same way that they feel. 
This dichotomy, however, neglects a more fundamental kind of empathy that both 
cognitive and emotional empathy rely upon. We call this “basic empathy.” According to 
phenomenologists, including Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, and Edith Stein, the most basic 
form of empathy acquaints you—in the most direct and immediate manner possible—with 
another’s experiential life. Importantly, on this account empathy is not about me having the 
 
1 The failure to define empathy and the impact this failure on medicine and medical education are also well-
documented (see, e.g., Pedersen 2009; Sulzer, Feinstein, and Wendland 2016). Moreover, in empathy research 
more broadly, Judith Hall and Rachel Schwartz argue that researchers should simply stop using the broad term 
“empathy” and instead use narrower terms that refer specifically to what they aim to study (Hall and Schwartz 
2019). We’re grateful an anonymous reviewer for bringing these articles to our attention. 
2 For a more detailed explication of this concept, including how it differs from concepts of empathy commonly 
used in the nursing literature, see (Fernandez and Zahavi 2020). 
3 The only work on phenomenological empathy training is by Magnus Englander (2019, 2014). However, his 
approach focuses on empathy training in higher education and is not specific to nursing. In light of concerns that 
nurses’ needs differ in important respects from other caring professions, such as psychotherapy (see, e.g., Morse 
et al., 1992), we here focus exclusively on health care. 
4 This distinction overlaps with the distinction between “clinical” or “trained” empathy, on the one hand, and 
“basic” or “trait” empathy, on the other (see, e.g., Alligood, 1992). However, the overlap is only partial. For the 
sake of simplicity, we limit ourselves to engaging with the psychological distinction between cognitive and 
emotional empathy. 
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same mental state as the other, but about me being experientially acquainted with an 
experience that is not my own. That is also why the phenomenologists often use the term 
“empathy” interchangeably with terms such as “other-experience” or “other-perception” 
(Husserl, [1932] 1960, p. 92; Scheler, [1923] 2008, p. 220). Moreover, the concept of basic 
empathy is used in two different, but closely related, senses. First, it refers to the capacity to 
perceive human bodies as expressive subjects, as minded beings, rather than as mere objects; 
second, it refers to our ability to perceive what the other is experiencing or doing, say, being 
sad, or insecure, or trying to reach for the bedpan. We’ll return to these two aspects of basic 
empathy in the following section. But, for now, let’s get a clearer sense of basic empathy 
with a concrete example. 
If your see a dog running toward your friend and your friend suddenly tenses her 
muscles and stands erect, you immediately perceive your friend as afraid of the dog—and, in 
turn, perceive the dog as a fearsome object in her lived world. On the one hand, you didn’t 
need to reason your way to this understanding by cataloguing various features of your 
friend’s posture or facial expression and concluding that she must be afraid. On the other 
hand, you didn’t need to feel afraid of the dog yourself to perceive your friend’s fear. Rather, 
we simply perceive bodily movements and gestures as expressive of desires, intentions, 
emotions, attitudes, and so on. It’s only in cases where we perceive the meaning of 
someone’s expressive behavior as ambiguous, or we otherwise have some reason to doubt 
our immediate understanding, that we turn to other cognitive or emotional techniques for 
making sense of others.  
One may argue that emotional empathy, like basic empathy, also provides an 
immediate understanding of the other. But consider the following example: You bump into a 
man on the street and he turns on you with a scowl—you immediately perceive him as angry. 
It’s certainly possible that, in this moment, you experience anger in response to his anger. But 
what if, instead of anger, you experienced fear, surprise, or concern? In all of these cases, you 
may still experience the man as angry. So, it’s not your anger that allows you to understand 
him as angry. Rather, anger, fear, surprise, or concern are all reactions to his anger. And, in 
virtue of being reactions, all of these states require that you already had an understanding of 
him as angry—an understanding provided by your capacity of basic empathy. 
 One key feature of basic empathy—and one that’s often misunderstood when we 
think that emotional empathy is the most basic way of understanding others—is that it does 
not involve emotional contagion or a fusion of identities. Following on our example above, 
when I perceive my friend as afraid or the man as angry, I perceive the fear or anger in them. 
I may, in reaction to their subjective state, become angry, afraid, surprised, or concerned; but 
it’s not my feeling that provides the understanding of the other. We only feel the way that we 
do because we already understand the other as expressing a particular state. Here, we have 
provided only a brief introduction to the phenomenological concept of basic empathy. But the 
concept is developed in considerable detail in both classical and contemporary works 
(Husserl [1931] 1960; Scheler [1923] 2008; Stein [1917] 1989; Zahavi 2010; 2011; 2014; 
2017; 2019). 
How Can We Train Basic Empathy? 
How can this understanding of empathy inform clinical practice? Basic empathy is a capacity 
that we all have. Excepting certain pathologies, infants manifest an innate sensitivity to social 
stimuli and come equipped with an innate, automatic, and pre-reflective ability to tune in to 
and respond to the expressive behavior of others (Rochat and Striano 1999).	However, this is 
not to say that basic empathy cannot be obstructed and, conversely, also facilitated.5 
 
5 Christine Sorrell Dinkins makes a similar argument in favor of William James’ pragmatist account of empathy. 
She says that rather than teach empathy, we might instead focus on unblocking empathy (Dinkins, 2018). 
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How can basic empathy be obstructed? Remember that the concept refers to two 
related capacities: First, the ability to perceive other human bodies as expressive subjects 
rather than mere objects; second, the ability to perceive the particular state that another 
human subject is in. There are certain kinds of attitudes, such as a scientific attitude, that 
allow us to perceive human bodies as mere objects—for instance, as complex biological 
organisms susceptible to disorder and dysfunction. There are, of course, cases where this kind 
of objectification is warranted and even required, such as when a surgeon is performing an 
operation. But some phenomenologists have expressed concern that healthcare professionals 
sometimes objectify their patients in ways that have a dehumanizing effect. Drew Leder, for 
instance, says, “…the doctor examines a physical body. Much of her/his medical training has 
de-emphasized lived embodiment from the first ‘patient’ encounter – that with a cadaver. The 
predominant task at hand is to search for a mechanical precipitant of disease, be it toxin, 
trauma, or bug” (Leder 1984, p. 33). He’s concerned that this view of the body can also 
become the patient’s own view, thereby creating the experience of one’s own body as distant 
or alien.6 
This is not, however, our primary concern when it comes to how healthcare 
professionals understand their patients. Rather, a more frequent problem concerns cases 
where others’ expressions and expressive behavior, which we understand through basic 
empathy, are ambiguous or opaque. In such cases, we typically turn to other strategies for 
understanding the other, such as techniques often referred to under the heading of cognitive 
empathy. We suggest that some of these techniques actually risk covering over or obscuring 
the other’s experience. And we propose an alternative that relies upon, rather than obstructs, 
our capacity for basic empathy.  
Consider the following example: A patient comes to your clinic complaining of pain 
after a miscarriage. It’s not immediately clear to you what the source of the pain is, so you 
and your team provide her with a full checkup and run the relevant diagnostic tests. In the 
end, you do not find anything to suggest that her pain has a physiological cause. In this 
situation, here are three ways that you might go about understanding and treating her pain. 
 
1. Theorizing: You know that pain can often have a psychological rather than a somatic 
cause. Drawing on this theoretical understanding, you conclude that the miscarriage 
must have been psychologically traumatizing and, therefore, while she does feel pain, 
it’s “all in her head.” Based on this theoretical understanding, you assure her that, 
with some time, she’ll feel well again. 
 
2. Imaginative perspective taking: You had a miscarriage some years ago and recall that, 
while the experience was distressing, you coped with these feelings and felt 
considerably better after a few weeks. When trying to put yourself in her place, you 
project your own experience onto her and expect her to feel the same way that you 
felt after your miscarriage. You consequently assure her that these feelings are 
nothing to worry about; they won’t last long and, like you, she will soon feel well 
again. 
 
3. Openness: Rather than draw on psychological theories or your own past experiences, 
you approach the patient from a standpoint of humility. You realize, for instance, that 
the pain she reports might at first seem relatively insignificant to you because, if you 
 
However, the definition of empathy that she operates with is much broader than the specific phenomenological 
focus that we have taken here. 
6 For a detailed overview of how the phenomenological concept of embodiment has been used to understand 
experiences of illness and health care, see (Fernandez 2020). 
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were in genuine pain, you would express it differently. Instead of projecting your own 
experience onto her, you acknowledge that what you take her to be expressing may 
not be exactly what she intended to express. You invite her to more fully and 
accurately express herself—whether through linguistic or bodily expression—so that 
you can develop a more accurate understanding of her experience. 
 
By providing these three styles of understanding, we do not mean to suggest that theoretical 
or imaginative-projective techniques are never useful in a clinical setting. Rather, we want to 
point out that these two modes of understanding in some situations risk covering over the 
other’s experience rather than bringing it to light. They will certainly provide some 
understanding of the other; but they also risk violating and doing away with the patient’s own 
perspective altogether. In short, they risk obscuring or undermining the kind of understanding 
that basic empathy offers, the kind of understanding that attends to the patient in the here and 
now. By initially putting the two former techniques to the side and starting from an attitude of 
openness, one might better be able to understand the patient in their individuality and from 
their particular situation. 
 If empathy training programs begin by acknowledging that the most prevalent way in 
which we understand others is through basic empathy, then such programs should not focus 
on teaching us empathic skills, but on unlearning some of the acquired skills that threaten to 
obstruct our basic empathy. In addition, it might be important to acquire techniques that 
effectively supplement basic empathy while maintaining an attitude of openness toward the 
patient, such as techniques for soliciting patient narratives. Such an approach may provide a 
more focused and effective means of training empathy and supporting genuine encounters 
between healthcare professionals and patients. 
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